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How does offshoring affect individual party preferences in multi-party systems? We argue 
that exposure to offshoring influences individual preferences for those political parties with 
clear policy positions on issues relevant for individuals with offshorable jobs (left, liberal and 
center-right parties), but does not affect voting decisions for parties concentrating on other 
issues (green parties or populist right parties). Examining individual-level data from five 
waves of the European Social Survey for 18 advanced democracies, we find that these effects 
vary by skill and exposure. Offshoring increases the preference for parties advocating eco-
nomic openness among the highly skilled. In contrast, among the low-skilled, those exposed 








The globalization of production has accelerated at rapid speed over the last decades. 
While originally mainly manifest in the form of international trade, the enormous technologi-
cal advances of recent decades have increasingly enabled firms to move their own production 
activities abroad. This phenomenon – frequently referred to as offshoring, “the migration of 
employment from [one country] to other (mostly poorer) countries” (Blinder, 2009: 41) – has 
confronted domestic workers not only with competition from foreign firms but also increas-
ingly from within their own firms. Importantly, offshoring not only affects low-skilled em-
ployees of manufacturing firms, which build factories in countries with low labor and produc-
tion costs, but is a phenomenon that nowadays affects many service sector employees as well 
(Head, Mayer, & Ries, 2009; Jensen & Kletzer, 2010). Call center assistance, accounting ser-
vices, or IT support are increasingly provided by individuals located in foreign countries. As a 
result, many white-collar workers that traditionally have been sheltered from international 
competition have suddenly become exposed to global competition – a trend that is likely to 
intensify in the future (Blinder, 2006; Crinò, 2009). The number of workers directly affected 
by offshoring has indeed grown considerably in recent years, and offshoring has become a 
prominent and contentious issue in the public debate about globalization. Some observers 
query whether offshoring is the “next industrial revolution” (Blinder, 2006: 113) threatening 
“virtually the entire employed middle class” (Luttwak, 1995: 7) or suggest that it poses “a 
greater threat than terrorism” (Roberts, 2014: 1), although others are more cautious, suggest-
ing that offshoring “is not the tsunami that many claim” (Drezner, 2004: 29). Not surprising-
ly, offshoring and outsourcing have turned into highly politicized issues (Mankiw & Swagel, 
2006; Owen, 2015). 
Surprisingly, we know comparatively little about the political consequences of this de-
velopment, especially when the non-US context is concerned. Several studies show that off-
shoring affects individuals’ policy preferences (e.g. Chase, 2008; Walter, 2010; Mansfield & 
Mutz, 2013; Owen & Quinn, 2013; 2015). How exactly these preferences are translated into 
politically meaningful actions such as the vote is less clear, however. The existing work relies 
solely on single country studies such as Switzerland (Walter, 2010) and most prominently the 
US (Mughan & Lacy, 2002; Margalit, 2011; Jensen, Quinn, & Weymouth, 2015). Although 
insightful, these cases are not comparable to the bulk of developed democracies: Switzerland 
is a consensus democracy, where all large political parties are always part of the government. 
And with its presidential political system, the dominance of two parties, and the very polar-
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ized political landscape, electoral politics in the US exhibits very different dynamics than 
electoral politics in Western Europe. Moreover, existing research mostly focuses either on the 
vote for one specific party family (Mughan & Lacy, 2002; Walter, 2010), or takes on an eco-
nomic voting perspective and predominantly focuses on the vote for the incumbent party 
(Margalit, 2011; Jensen et al., 2015).  
In contrast, we know next to nothing about how offshoring – and, incidentally, globali-
zation more generally – affects partisan politics in the multi-party systems that are character-
istic of most developed democracies. The link between the individual-level risks and opportu-
nities associated with offshoring and voting behavior is an important link in the causal chain 
between offshoring exposure and political outcomes because political parties are important 
actors in national policymaking. In most modern democracies, voters have a choice between a 
broad range of political parties who pursue very different policy agendas in response to glob-
alization (e.g. Boix, 1998; Garrett, 1998; Swank, 2002; Kriesi et al., 2008; Haupt, 2010a; 
Burgoon, 2012a). Understanding whether offshoring is a salient issue for voters’ electoral 
decisions, for which political parties offshoring is likely to matter most, and how specifically 
it affects the electoral success of political parties in a comparative perspective therefore im-
proves our understanding of the link between offshoring and partisan politics. Considering 
that offshoring is a phenomenon that is both distinct from but related to international trade 
and other forms of globalization, answering these questions also contributes to a better under-
standing of the nexus between globalization and party politics in multi-party systems more 
generally.  
This paper provides such an analysis. Building on the insight that the effects of offshor-
ing vary significantly among citizens, we argue that offshoring represents a relevant issue for 
some political parties, whereas its saliency for other political parties is low. Because highly 
skilled individuals tend to benefit from the opportunities of offshoring, they are more likely to 
support parties that advocate economic openness and international competition, especially 
liberal and center-right parties. In contrast, low-skilled individuals with easily offshorable 
jobs are threatened by the globalization of production and are therefore expected to vote for 
the social protection and compensation that left parties promise. Offshoring is hence an im-
portant issue for those political party families with clear policy positions relevant for individ-
uals exposed to offshoring, i.e. left, liberal and center-right parties. In contrast, the risks asso-
ciated with offshoring are a much less salient issue for political parties who concentrate more 
on cultural issues, such as post-material issues in the case of green parties or immigration in 
the case of populist right parties. 
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Empirically, this paper utilizes cross-national survey data from 18 advanced West Eu-
ropean countries over the period from 2002 to 2010 to examine how offshoring affects indi-
vidual preferences for policy positions and party families. Our results show that exposure to 
offshoring-induced risks and opportunities has significant effects on electoral behavior: Low-
skilled individuals working in offshorable occupations are more likely to vote for compensa-
tory policies put forward by left parties than low-skilled individuals working in sheltered oc-
cupations. In contrast, individuals in offshorable occupations are more likely to vote for par-
ties advocating economic competition and openness, especially liberal and center-right par-
ties, if they are highly skilled. At the same time, offshoring risks and opportunities play a mi-
nor role for the electoral support of populist right and green parties. Our findings thus support 
the notion that the effects of globalization on partisan politics are heterogeneous, affecting 
some political parties and party families more strongly than others (Burgoon, 2012a). This 
implies that some political parties are more pressured than others in trying to reconcile their 
constituents’ policy demands with the demands of special interests and global competitive 
pressures emanating from general trends of globalization. 
 
 
2. Offshoring and the Vote 
 
How does offshoring affect partisan politics? To answer this question, we focus on elec-
toral politics as a particularly salient arena of party competition and examine how offshoring 
affects individuals’ voting behavior. Building on the insight that the heterogeneous individu-
al-level effects of offshoring create both winners and losers, we discuss how these distribu-
tional consequences influence individual policy preferences and voting behavior. In a final 
step, we discuss how the effect of offshoring on vote choice differs among party families. 
 
2.1. The Individual-Level Effects of Offshoring: Risks and Opportunities 
Offshoring creates both risks and opportunities. It poses a substantial threat to workers 
whose jobs are likely to be moved abroad. These workers not only face the risk of losing their 
jobs altogether, but also experience downward pressure on their wages, even if their jobs are 
not actually offshored (Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg, 2008). As a result, workers exposed to 
the negative risks of offshoring are more likely to experience a higher level of labor market 
risk and to express feelings of economic insecurity (Scheve & Slaughter, 2004; Walter, 2010, 
2015). Typically, the jobs most at risk from offshoring are routine jobs that can easily be pro-
 6 
vided from anywhere in the world. But, even non-routine jobs in the service sector that do not 
require face-to-face interactions are nowadays more and more likely to be moved abroad 
(Acemoglu & Autor, 2011). As a result, low-skilled individuals with potentially offshorable 
jobs are most strongly exposed to the negative consequences of offshoring. Their jobs are 
most likely to be moved abroad, they face increasing difficulties of finding a new job in the 
same occupation when most firms engage in similar offshoring activities, and their wages are 
likely to be depressed (Feenstra & Hanson, 1999; Hummels et al., 2014). 
At the same time, offshoring enhances the profitability of internationally active firms. 
New developments in trade theory (Melitz, 2003) suggest that only the most productive firms 
engage abroad, be it in the form of international trade or FDI (Helpman, Melitz, & Yeaple, 
2004). This in turn benefits owners, shareholders, and those employed by these firms – typi-
cally individuals with strong abilities (Helpman, Itskhoki, & Redding, 2010). New foreign 
activities often also enhance domestic activities in other parts of the firm, such as research, 
marketing, or distribution, and therefore increase demand for workers in these areas (Amiti & 
Konings, 2007; Kasahara & Rodrigue, 2008). Moreover, although the phenomenon of off-
shoring is often thought of in terms of the migration of jobs from rich countries to poor coun-
tries, individuals in rich countries often also provide services for firms located in countries 
with a low-skilled workforce. For example, some firms with headquarters in less developed 
economies have built up technology research centers in advanced economies and hire local 
engineers to develop new technologies and products. This means that individuals providing 
such services can sell their skills to a wider set of potential customers. This, in turn, improves 
job security and wages for these individuals, allowing them to benefit from the opportunities 
offshoring creates. Since the precondition in this case is that these individuals possess skills 
that are very competitive and sought after internationally, the benefits of offshoring are more 
likely to accrue to well-educated individuals. Not surprisingly, offshoring has been found to 
increase the wages of high-skilled individuals (Hummels et al., 2014) and to reduce feelings 
of job insecurity among this group (Walter, 2015). 
It is important to note that, despite the accelerating offshoring trend, most individuals in 
a society remain unaffected by this new form of global competition. Even though they may be 
exposed to offshoring indirectly as consumers – for example, when calling a call center locat-
ed in a foreign country – they are not directly affected as labor market participants. In fact, 
many jobs simply cannot be offshored, because the services they provide require them to be 
on-site (Blinder, 2009). Workers employed in such occupations are therefore much more shel-
tered from the globalization of production than workers in occupations that provide more im-
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personal services or general manufactured goods, and this applies to both high-skilled and 
low-skilled workers in sheltered occupations.  
Most existing studies on the individual-level effects of offshoring assume that it has a 
uniform and negative effect on all affected workers (Scheve & Slaughter, 2004; e.g., Margalit, 
2011; Mansfield & Mutz, 2013; Owen, 2015). In contrast, the discussion above suggests that 
the effects of offshoring vary by an individual’s skill level (see also Walter, 2010; Wren & 
Rehm, 2013; Walter, 2015). Offshoring creates the highest labor market risks for low-skilled 
individuals working in offshorable occupations (e.g. assembly-line workers). Equally low-
skilled individuals working in sheltered occupations (e.g. cleaning personnel) are better off 
than their counterparts in offshorable occupations, although in today’s ‘knowledge economy’ 
they continue to experience higher labor market risks than high-skilled workers in sheltered 
occupations (e.g. doctors or teachers). Finally, highly skilled individuals in offshorable posi-
tions (e.g. engineers or consultants) are the main beneficiaries of the globalization of produc-
tion. This suggests that labor market risks are much more unequally distributed among work-
ers exposed to offshoring than among workers in sheltered occupations. As a result, exposure 
to offshoring is likely to widen economic inequality between low- and high-skilled workers. 
 
2.2. Offshoring and Party Preferences 
Much research has shown that individuals support or oppose policies based on the mate-
rial consequences of these policies (e.g., Iversen & Soskice, 2001; Beaulieu, 2002; Hays, 
Ehrlich, & Peinhardt, 2005; Mayda & Rodrik, 2005; Rehm, 2009).1 With regard to offshoring, 
this suggests that low-skilled individuals with offshorable jobs should have a strong prefer-
ence for protection from offshoring or, more indirectly, protection from these risks through a 
generous welfare state. In contrast, highly skilled individuals, who benefit from offshoring, 
have a lower need for a state-funded social safety net and are also among the main contribu-
tors to the financing of the welfare state. Individuals sheltered from offshoring should have 
more moderate policy preferences than their more exposed counterparts, with low-skilled in-
dividuals demanding more protection than high-skilled individuals.	   Existing empirical re-
search supports these conjectures (e.g., Walter & Maduz, 2009; Walter, 2010; Wren & Rehm, 
2013; Walter, 2015).2 Importantly, this argument does not presuppose that individuals voice 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Note that policy support or opposition may also be driven by many non-material considerations (e.g., 
Mansfield & Mutz, 2013). 
2 Table 4 in the online appendix replicates these results for the data used in the analysis below, using measures 
for labor market insecurity and preferences for redistribution as dependent variables. In line with previous stud-
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clear preferences about offshoring itself, but that the labor market risks and opportunities cre-
ated by offshoring translate into more general social and economic policy preferences. 
However, policy preferences can only have an actual impact on the policymaking pro-
cess if they are effectively brought into the political arena. In democratic countries, the most 
straightforward instrument for individuals in this regard is their vote. Although research on 
the effects of offshoring on voting behavior to date has been confined to single country-
studies or votes for specific parties or incumbents, it suggests that offshoring has the potential 
to affect electoral outcomes: Mughan and Lacy (2002) show that in the 1996 US presidential 
elections, voters worried about the future of American jobs were more likely to vote for presi-
dential candidate Ross Perot, who ran on an anti-offshoring platform. Margalit (2011) finds 
that offshoring-related job losses in the manufacturing sector were associated with significant 
reductions in incumbent support in the 2004 US presidential elections. Taking a longer-term 
perspective, Jensen, Quinn, and Weymouth (2015) show for the US that incumbent support 
has on average been higher in counties with a high concentration of tradable services, typical-
ly dominated by skill-intensive, offshorable jobs. Finally, Walter (2010) shows that in 2007, 
individuals threatened by offshoring in Switzerland were more likely to vote for the Social 
Democratic party than individuals who stood to benefit from this trend.3 While insightful, 
these studies leave open a number of questions: Does offshoring have an impact on voting 
behavior across a broader set of countries characterized by multi-party systems? Do offshor-
ing winners and losers have distinct party preferences? And are all political parties equally 
affected by the offshoring trend? 
Our argument builds on the assumption that political parties differ with regard to both 
the policies they advocate and the saliency they put on different policy areas. This is particu-
larly true for political parties in multi-party systems, where parties occupy a large range of 
positions in the political space usually demarcated by the traditional left-right (or economic) 
dimension and a cultural dimension (e.g., Kitschelt, 1994; Benoit & Laver, 2006; Marks et al., 
2006). Offshoring has clearly identifiable distributive effects, which predominantly affect 
preferences for policies located on the economic dimension – social and labor market policies, 
protectionist and market-liberalizing policies, and fiscal policies. Exposure to offshoring 
should therefore primarily affect individuals’ party preferences for political parties with a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
ies, it shows that preferences for redistribution are strongest among low-skilled individuals in offshorable occu-
pations and least pronounced among high-skilled individuals in offshorable occupations. 
3 A few authors have looked at the nexus between voters and party positions on specific globalization-related 
issues such as trade liberalization (Hiscox, 2002; Hellwig, 2014), though none of these studies specifically ad-
dresses the issue of offshoring. 
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salient and distinct position on these specific policies and the economic left-right dimension 
more generally.4 We therefore expect offshoring to shape voting behavior for political parties 
located at the extreme ends of the state-market-divide of party competition most strongly. 
Parties located at the leftist end of the economic dimension are likely to be particularly 
attractive to low-skilled voters exposed to offshoring. These parties typically pursue policies 
that strengthen the welfare state, redistribute income from the rich to the poor, and other poli-
cies that protect vulnerable workers from labor market risks and should therefore be particu-
larly attractive for the losers of the offshoring trend (Hicks & Swank, 1992; Schmidt, 1996; 
Korpi & Palme, 2003; Allan & Scruggs, 2004). Hence, we expect low-skilled individuals in 
offshorable occupations to exhibit a higher propensity to vote for parties advocating generous 
welfare policies and, specifically, left parties more than other voters. In contrast, the econom-
ic and fiscal policies pursued by leftist parties tend to conflict with the material interest of 
individuals benefitting from offshoring. Higher taxes, a large welfare state and income redis-
tribution more generally, are not only directly paid for by the high-income earners in interna-
tionally competitive jobs (for a related argument, see Wren & Rehm, 2013), but these policies 
may also hamper international competitiveness and hence reduce the economic prospects of 
these individuals (Alesina & Perotti, 1997). As a result, the winners of the offshoring trend 
should be less likely to vote for leftist parties. Notably, we not only expect significant differ-
ences in the voting behavior of low-and high-skilled workers, but also within each of these 
groups. Low-skilled (high-skilled) individuals in offshorable jobs should be significantly 
more (less) likely to vote for parties advocating leftist policies than high-skilled individuals 
whose jobs cannot be offshored. 
In contrast, parties located at the rightist end of the state-market-dimension should be 
particularly attractive for high-skilled individuals in offshorable occupations. As voters with 
high incomes and low labor-market risks, these offshoring beneficiaries not only know that 
they will in all likelihood be net payers into the welfare system but also benefit from market-
oriented policies, low levels of government spending and lower taxes. As a result, they are 
likely to vote for parties who pursue market-liberal policies, especially liberal and center-right 
parties. Although the parties in these categories differ with regard to their position on other 
policy dimensions (Benoit & Laver, 2006; Schmidt, 2010), they share common grounds with 
regard to economic and social policies. Liberal parties tend to be skeptical vis-à-vis govern-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Note that in its most general conceptualization, globalization defined as a general phenomenon comprising 
economic, cultural, and political globalization is likely to affect partisan politics on both dimensions (Kriesi et 
al., 2008; Hellwig, 2014). However, we focus solely on the globalization of production. 
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ment intervention in the economy, actively advocate free market policies including a further 
opening of the economy, and promote lower levels of taxation, lower social spending and a 
less generous provision of social rights (Hicks & Swank, 1992; Allan & Scruggs, 2004; 
Benoit & Laver, 2006; Zohlnhöfer, Obinger, & Wolf, 2008). Center-right parties tend to be 
located somewhat more to the center of the left-right dimension, but typically also promote 
free market policies, although some tend to be more favorable towards embedding these po-
lices in a resilient welfare state system, especially Christian democratic parties (Van 
Kersbergen, 1995; van Kersbergen & Manow, 2009). Both liberal and center-right parties 
therefore carry a strong appeal to high-skilled individuals in offshorable occupations, whereas 
they are least attractive for low-skilled voters, especially those in highly offshorable occupa-
tions. Once more, we expect the difference in the voting propensity between high- and low-
skilled individuals to be much higher among individuals exposed to offshoring than among 
individuals in sheltered occupations. 
Unlike party families who clearly position themselves on the state-market dimension 
and for whom social and economic policies are particularly salient, however, we do not ex-
pect offshoring to be an important issue for political parties for whom the cultural dimension 
of party competition carries greater importance or whose economic policies do not specifical-
ly benefit either the winners or losers of the globalization of production. The two most im-
portant party families in this regard are populist right or green parties. The effect of offshor-
ability on preferences for populist right parties is theoretically ambiguous. For one, these par-
ties focus mainly on immigration. This is an important topic on the cultural dimension, but 
also matters in material terms. In terms of economic policies, these parties are by no means 
proponents of welfare state retrenchment, but tend to favor protectionist trade policies and 
social protection that benefits nationals only (Schmidt, 2010). For this reason, previous stud-
ies have argued that right-wing populist parties are particularly appealing to modernization 
and globalization losers more broadly defined (Betz, 1993; Kriesi et al., 2006). We contend, 
however, that populist right parties are attractive to low-skilled workers across the board. 
They are either threatened by offshoring and free trade when they work in economically ex-
posed occupations, or by labor market competition through low-skilled immigrants when they 
work in sheltered occupations (Burgoon, 2012a; Dancygier & Walter, 2015). This implies that 
low-skilled individuals should in general be more likely to vote for rightist parties than high-
skilled individuals, with no reinforcing effect of offshoring exposure. Similarly, high-skilled 
voters are expected to be much less likely to vote for the populist right across the board for 
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both material (they tend to benefit from cheap labor) and immaterial reasons (higher levels of 
education are associated with lower levels of xenophobia). 
Green parties, in contrast, share an emphasis on environmental protection and other 
post-materialistic issues and are both less concerned about and less homogenous with regard 
to questions about welfare state expansion and free market policies (Benoit & Laver, 2006). 
With regard to globalization, the issue that primarily defines the Greens’ position is “the cul-
tural aspect of globalization processes” (Dolezal, 2010: 548). As ‘the’ post-materialist party 
family, we therefore expect the material interests of individuals affected by offshoring to play 
a negligible role in explaining party preferences for green parties. Rather, we expect high-
skilled individuals across the board to be more likely to vote for these parties than low-skilled 
individuals (Schumacher, 2014). 
 
*** Table 1 about here *** 
 
Table 1 summarizes our expectations about the effect of offshoring on individual party 
preferences. As discussed, this effect should be strongest for political parties with distinct and 
salient policy positions regarding welfare policies and market-liberal policies, and as such 
those with polar positions on the social-economic dimension of party competition. This sug-
gests that offshoring should be most consequential for left, liberal, and center-right parties, 
who serve as natural agents for the losers and winners of the offshoring trend by advocating 
policies that cater to their specific interests. Among high-skilled individuals, job offshorabil-
ity should increase the propensity to vote for parties located at the market-liberal end of the 
left-right divide in partisan politics, whereas this effect should be reversed among low-skilled 
individuals. These expectations also suggest that the difference in voting propensity should be 
significantly larger between low- and high-skilled individuals in offshorable occupations than 
between low- and high-skilled individuals in sheltered occupations. At the same time, we ex-
pect that the increasing prevalence of offshoring should not be associated with individuals’ 
propensity to vote for political parties who politicize more on the cultural dimension of party 
competition, especially populist right and green parties. 
 
 
3. Research Design 
 
 12 
We use survey data from five consecutive waves of the European Social Survey (ESS) 
conducted between 2002 and 2010 in 18 West European countries to test the conditional ef-
fect of exposure to job offshorability on partisan preferences and voting behavior.5 This set of 
countries is especially useful because it represents developed capitalist democracies with es-
tablished multi-party systems, which allows us to test our argument about differentiated parti-
san effects. We focus on working-age respondents, because globalization-induced labor mar-
ket risks should be most important for this section of the population. 
 
3.1. Dependent Variable: Preference for Policy Position and Party Family 
To examine how offshoring affects voting behavior, we proceed in two steps. We first 
examine the effect of offshoring-exposure on individuals’ propensity to vote for parties advo-
cating specific policies, focusing on parties’ overall left-right position on the economic di-
mension, party positions on welfare-state and on positioning on market-liberal policies. In a 
second step, we examine how exposure to offshoring influences individuals’ likelihood to 
vote for a specific party family.6  
Policy positions of political parties are measured with data collected by the Compara-
tive Manifesto Project CMP (Volkens et al., 2013), which codes the direction and quantity of 
policy statements from electoral programs of all parties participating in a national election in a 
given year into 56 programmatic categories. Parties’ positions on the economic dimension are 
captured with the CMP score for the party’s overall orientation to the left or right. This score 
ranges from -48.0 to 72.5, with higher values indicating a more rightist position. Party posi-
tions on welfare-state policies are measured with the respective CMP indicator, which con-
tains partisan positions regarding social justice (including statements about social equality or 
the need for a fair distribution of resources) and welfare-state expansion (including mentions 
of the need to maintain or expand social security schemes). Finally, we measure party posi-
tions regarding market-liberal policies with the respective CMP indicator, which builds on 
statements about free enterprise capitalism (like the superiority of the individual enterprise 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Iceland, Ire-
land, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. Table 2 in the online 
appendix in the appendix summarizes the survey coverage for each country and ESS round. The results are ro-
bust to including countries from Eastern Europe (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic, 
and Slovenia) and Israel. 
6 Table A1 provides detailed information about the operationalization and descriptive statistics of all variables in 
the reported models. Further information on the distribution of all dependent and key independent variables is 
provided in the online appendix. 
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over the state or favorable mentions to protect property rights) and economic orthodoxy (like 
the reduction of budget deficits or retrenchment in crises). Higher values indicate a stronger 
approval of the respective policies. 
National parties are classified into cross-nationally comparable party families based on 
two data sources: the dataset about the composition of governments in OECD-countries by 
Schmidt (2012) and the Manifesto Project Data Collection (Volkens et al., 2013). We focus 
on the five party families that have been most common in Europe in the period we study: left, 
liberal, center-right, populist right, and green parties. Studies have shown that European par-
ties have converged regarding their policy positions and have increasingly homogenous vot-
ing distributions (Caramani, 2011; Camia & Caramani, 2012). To classify individual parties 
into these party families, we proceed as follows: First, we identify the party family separately 
on the basis of each database. We then merge these classifications in accordance with the fol-
lowing rules: If both databases report the same party family for a single party, we classify the 
latter accordingly. If one database codes a party as a member of one of our five party families 
and the other database codes it as a residual party family or provides no information, we clas-
sify the party in line with the information-providing database. If both databases provide no 
information at all, we code the party as missing. If the two databases disagree about the spe-
cific party family, we gathered more data (e.g. the membership of a party in a political group 
in the European Parliament) to classify this party accurately.7 
We then match this information about each party’s policy positions and its party family 
to ESS respondents based on which national party they voted for in the last national election. 
For robustness, we additionally use information about respondents’ current closeness to a 
political party.	  Each individual is thus assigned his or her preferred party’s policy position and 
classified as voting for (or feeling close to) one of the five party families. While party policy 
positions are continuous measures, we create five dummy variables recording whether a re-
spondent voted for or feels close to each party family. 
 
3.2. Independent Variables: Exposure to Offshoring and Skill-Level 
Our argument suggests that offshoring affects individual party preferences, but that this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 This is the case in about 2 percent of all observations. Because populist right parties are small in most coun-
tries, we additionally cross-check our classification with the list of right-wing populist parties provided by 
Mudde (2007). We additionally code the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) as a populist-right party. Although the 
CMP codes the SVP as an agrarian party, country specialists point out that the party evolved in to a populist 
right party in the 1990s (Kriesi et al., 2008). Table A2 provides information concerning the categorization of 
both classifications.  
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effect differs between low-skilled individuals, for whom the risks of offshoring outweigh the 
benefits, and high-skilled individuals, for whom offshoring predominantly opens new per-
spectives and opportunities. These considerations suggest three key independent variables: 
exposure to offshoring, skill-level, and an interaction term between these variables to address 
the conditional effect of both. 
Exposure to offshoring: As discussed above, not all workers are equally exposed to the 
offshoring trend that has become increasingly important over the past years. Rather, jobs dif-
fer with regard to the degree to which they can be offshored. To measure respondents’ occu-
pational offshorability, we match the information about respondents’ occupation contained in 
the ESS survey with information from an offshorability-index developed by Blinder (2009). 
This index measures a job’s potential to be moved abroad, i.e. whether the service the job 
provides can theoretically be delivered over long distances with little or no degradation in 
quality, for more than 800 occupational categories.8 It allows us to assess individual exposure 
to offshoring on an occupational basis. Because it measures the potential for offshoring, it 
connects closely with our theoretical argument about offshoring risk. Moreover, in a valida-
tion study, Smith and Rivkin (2008) found Blinder’s classification to be highly correlated 
with a more intuitive coding of offshorability by business school students. 9 
Blinder ranks each occupation’s offshorability potential on an ordinal 4-point scale 
ranging from no offshoring-potential to high offshoring-potential according to the following 
criteria: If workers are required to be at a specific work location in their country in order to 
perform their task, they are considered to have a highly non-offshorable occupation (category 
1). If the criterion of workplace-specificity is not fulfilled, the second criterion determines 
whether a worker has to be physically close to his or her work unit. If not, the occupation falls 
into the category of highly offshorable occupations (category 4). The remaining occupations 
are then classified into the two middle categories of intermediate offshorability. If the entire 
work unit has to be in the same country, the occupation is coded as somewhat offshorable 
(category 2), and as offshorable (category 3) otherwise. All professions not listed by Blinder 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The categories are based on the US Labor Department’s Standard Occupational Classification (SOC). While 
this classification was developed for the US, we think it is reasonable to assume that it can be applied to compa-
rable occupations in other advanced economies as well. We adapted this classification for the corresponding 
ISCO-codes (International Standard Classification of Occupations) available in the ESS. For detailed infor-
mation on applying the index to the ESS survey data see Walter and Maduz (2009). 
9 We also rely on Blinder’s measure because alternative measures of offshorability by Acemoglu and Autor 
(2011) as well as Jensen and Kletzer (2010) do not cover all occupations and/or exclude theoretically relevant 
information – such as (non-)routinization – from the construction of their indices. 
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are coded as not offshorable. Because Blinder cautions that the four categories cannot neces-
sarily be interpreted as an ordinal scale, we construct a dummy variable differentiating be-
tween potentially offshorable (categories 2, 3, and 4) and non-offshorable (category 1) occu-
pations.10 The proportion of respondents in offshorable occupations varies between 30.0% in 
Iceland and 47.7% in France. 
Skill-level: The operationalization of an individual’s skill-level is based on the respond-
ent’s educational background. We use the total number of years during which a respondent 
has been in full-time education. Of course, individuals can also dispose of skills acquired 
through on-the-job-training and individuals with low levels of education can also deliver 
high-quality work, but empirical research has shown that higher educational achievement is 
positively related to higher occupational skills and higher levels of productivity (Jones, 2001; 
Spitz-Oener, 2006). Education years therefore serve as a proxy for individual skill-levels.11 
As a robustness check, we additionally use information on the highest level of education a 
respondent has achieved. The answers are standardized into the ISCED-classification of edu-
cation levels. We adapted the 7-point ISCED-classification by combining several categories, 
in part because of some data limitations in the ESS and in one case because of a highly 
asymmetrical frequency distribution (ISCED categories 3 and 4). This leaves us with 4 differ-
ent categories ranging from less than lower secondary to completed tertiary education.12 
 
*** Figure 1 about here *** 
 
Interaction term between offshorability and skill-level: To capture the expected condi-
tional effect of individual exposure to offshoring and an individual’s skill-level on partisan 
preferences, we use an interaction term between the two. Our argument makes clear predic-
tions about the nature of this interaction term. Since the offshoring-trend creates more labor 
market risks for low-skilled individuals, this group of voters should be particularly likely to 
vote for political parties that advocate welfare-policies, particularly leftist parties, suggesting 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Results are robust to using the ordinal and metric measure of offshorability, that further differentiates the off-
shorability of different occupations (Blinder, 2009). Results are also robust to recoding the offshorability dummy 
such that the offshorable category contains only category 3 and 4 occupations. 
11 Education years higher than 25 years higher values are recoded to the maximum of 25 years, because a) one 
can plausibly assume that the marginal effect of the additional skills on productivity in this stage of education 
(post-doctoral education) is very small and b) this procedure allows us to eliminate implausible and extreme 
values. 
12 Table 3 in the online appendix provides further information. 
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a negative and statistically significant interaction term. Highly skilled individuals should pre-
fer political parties that are located more to the right of the political spectrum and who cham-
pion market liberal policies, especially liberal and center-right parties, suggesting a positive 
and statistically significant interaction term for these dependent variables. In contrast, we do 
not expect a statistically significant interaction term for populist right or green parties. Figure 
1 shows the distribution of education years respondents in non-offshorable (left-hand panel) 
and offshorable occupations (right-hand panel). It reveals that education is indeed similarly 
distributed in both groups suggesting that both high- and low-skilled individuals can indeed 
be exposed to and sheltered from the offshoring trend.13  
 
3.3. Control Variables 
We consider a number of variables that control for alternative explanations of individual 
voting behavior. Following our theoretical argument the selection of observable confounders 
bears on a risk-based model of voting behavior and previous literature (e.g., Mughan & Lacy, 
2002; Mughan, Bean, & McAllister, 2003; Vowles & Bean, 2006; Hellwig, 2008; Walter, 
2010). We include respondent’s income, gender, age, whether he or she is unemployed, lives 
in an urban area, and cultural attitudes toward immigration in our preferred specification. Re-
spondent’s income is measured by a self-classification into one of twelve income classes. To 
provide cross-national comparability we recode this variable so that it represents the deviation 
of the respondent’s income-class from the country-specific median income-class. We include 
age in years and a squared age term to capture the possibility that age has a curvilinear effect. 
Cultural attitudes toward immigration are measured on an 11-point scale, with the statements 
‘cultural life is enriched’ and ‘cultural life is undermined’ by people from other countries 
coming to live here at the respective poles.14 The remaining individual-level variables are 
coded as dummy variables. Furthermore, we estimate an enhanced specification controlling 
for additional variables related to labor market risk, such as outsider status (Rueda, 2005; 
Emmenegger, 2012), skill specificity (Iversen & Soskice, 2001), or routinization (Acemoglu 
& Autor, 2011). In additional robustness checks we also control for self-employment, union 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 The interaction term also allows us to address the “learning to love globalization” argument that education 
correlates strongly with cosmopolitan and tolerant attitudes (Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2006). If these attitudes 
were the overriding determinant of individuals’ electoral choices, we should not observe any differences among 
exposed and sheltered individuals with the same level of education. 
14 This variable allows us to directly address the ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ argument put forward by Mansfield and Mutz 
(2013). If xenophobic values were the only driving factor, we should not see any remaining differences with 
regard to offshorability and skill-level. 
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membership, political interest, church attendance, economic attitudes toward immigration, or 
ideology using self-placement on a 10-point left-right scale. 
On the macro-level, we include three variables to explain differences in the strength be-
tween party families across countries by controlling for the different national contexts in 
which respondents take their voting decision. The unemployment rate is a proxy for the over-
all state of the economy. The stock of foreign direct investment (FDI) captures the country’s 
exposure to the globalization of production at the macro-level. Both variables proxy the gen-
eral level of individual labor market risks, which can be expected to shape policy preferences 
and thus affect party preferences (e.g., Hellwig & Samuels, 2007; Kayser, 2007; Arzheimer, 
2009). In addition, we include the effective number of electoral parties to account for the fact 




We perform our analyses on a pooled dataset containing roughly 53000 respondents in 
18 countries at 5 points in time. Our preferred model specification is a random effects multi-
level model with individuals nested within countries estimating the conditional effect of skill-
level and offshoring exposure on respondents’ preference for party positions and their elec-
toral preference for each type of political party. This model allows us to account for the fact 
that respondents from the same country share a common context and are, thus, not necessarily 
independent from each other (Steenbergen & Jones, 2002; Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2008; 
Hox, 2010). To account for the temporal dimension, we include dummies for the different 
survey waves in all model specifications. To analyze party position preferences we rely on an 
OLS specification. Concerning preferences for party families, we employ a probit specifica-
tion. The disadvantage in modeling party preference separately for all party families is that it 
does not allow to model choice simultaneously. As a robustness check, we therefore also use 
a multinomial logit model with country dummies (Long & Freese, 2006). We also conduct a 
series of further robustness checks concerning different measures of skills and offshorability, 
restricting the sample size to those individuals who are either in paid work or actively looking 
for a job, including retirees, using current closeness to a political party instead of voting be-
havior as an indicator of party preferences, including more individual-level controls, includ-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 We include this variable only in the models estimating the determinants of preferences for party families, and 
only as an additional robustness check in the party positions models. All results are robust to including other 
macro-level variables, such as trade openness and social expenditures. 
 18 
ing more macro-level control variables, or extending the number of countries. The results 
shown below are generally robust to these changes.16 
 
 
4. Empirical Findings 
 
Does offshoring affect partisan politics through individuals’ electoral preferences? The 
results for party position and family preferences presented in table 2 and 3 indicate that job 
offshorability is indeed associated with variation in the voting behavior of individual voters 
and that this effect is conditional on individual skill-levels. As predicted by our argument, the 
analysis suggests that voters take their offshoring-related material interests into account when 
making electoral choices: Offshoring losers, i.e. low-skilled individuals in offshorable occu-
pations, vote for different political parties than offshoring winners, i.e. high-skilled individu-
als with potentially offshorable jobs. Importantly, this is only the case for party families that 
strongly advocate economic and social policies targeted towards compensating the losers or 
benefitting the winners of the offshoring trend; i.e., left, liberal, and center-right parties. In 
contrast, voting behavior for populist right and green parties does not differ among individu-
als in offshorable and sheltered occupations. Offshoring thus does not affect all party families 
equally. 
 
4.1. Offshoring and Preferences for Party Positions 
How does exposure to offshoring affect individuals’ preference for specific party posi-
tions? Table 2 presents regression results for our analysis of individual preferences for par-
ties’ general left-right position, their position regarding welfare-state policies and their posi-
tion regarding market-liberal policies.  
 
*** Table 2 about here *** 
 
The results are in line with our theoretical expectations: Exposure to offshoring has sta-
tistically significant effects on individuals’ preferences for different party positions. Low-
skilled individuals working in offshorable occupations are statistically less likely to vote for 
parties to the right of the political spectrum than low-skilled individuals in sheltered occupa-
tions (column 1). As indicated by the positive and statistically significant interaction term and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 The detailed results of these robustness tests are provided in the online appendix. 
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illustrated by figure 2A, however, this relationship changes with higher levels of education. 
Among individuals who have received at least 11 years of schooling, job offshorability in-
creases the inclination to vote for more rightist parties at a statistically significant level.  
Turning to more specific partisan positions on welfare-state expansion and social justice 
as well as party positions regarding market-liberal policies such as free enterprise capitalism 
and economic orthodoxy, we find similar patterns. Exposure to offshoring increases individu-
als’ probability to vote for parties advocating a strong welfare state when they are poorly edu-
cated, but decreases this probability when they are highly educated (column 2). In contrast, 
among the high-skilled, those working in offshorable occupations are significantly more like-
ly to vote for parties with market-liberal policy positions than high-skilled workers sheltered 
from global competition, whereas exposure to offshoring significantly reduces this likelihood 
among the low-skilled (column 3). In both cases and in line with our argument, higher educa-
tion reverses the relationship between offshorability and preferences for welfare-state and 
market-liberal policies respectively (see figures 2B and 2C). 
 
*** Figure 2 about here *** 
 
Interestingly, the policy preferences of individuals in sheltered occupations actually ap-
pear to be at odds with the conventional wisdom of traditional partisan models. Among indi-
viduals in non-offshorable occupations, higher levels of education are associated with partisan 
preferences for more leftist parties on a general scale and less market liberal policies. Howev-
er, the effect of skill-level is not statistically significant in case of welfare-state policies. This 
finding might reflect the fact that high-skilled individuals sheltered from offshoring are those 
that provide many of the services an advanced welfare state offers and echoes the argument 
that many left parties opened up for new, left-libertarian voter groups in the late 20th century 
(Kitschelt, 1988). Importantly, this finding also suggests that offshoring, as a direct exposure 
to the global economy, creates a cleavage in party preferences between individuals exposed to 
this form of globalization and those sheltered from it that goes beyond education. 
The results for the control variables in our analysis are in line with our expectations: On 
the micro-level, we find that poorer, female, younger respondents, those living in urban areas 
and the unemployed are more likely to vote for leftist and welfare-state supporting parties and 
less likely to vote for parties advocating market-liberal policies. Immigrations skeptics tend to 
prefer parties to the right and are less inclined to prefer parties explicitly proposing welfare-
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state extension. On the macro-level, support for rightist and market-liberal parties overall 
tends to be higher in countries with higher unemployment rates and with higher levels of FDI. 
These results are highly robust to a variety of modifications. One obvious objection to 
our analyses could be that our measure for offshorability is highly correlated with other forms 
of labor market risk. The most prominent candidate here is routinization, because workers 
with routine jobs are most likely to lose their jobs in a deindustrializing world, and routine 
jobs could also be the ones that can most easily be offshored. We use Acemoglu and Autor’s 
(2011) routinization measure to test this conjecture. Correlating routinization and job offshor-
ability, we find that they are indeed positively correlated, but only with r=0.14. Moreover, 
including routinization as a control variable does not change our results for offshorability. 
Other types of labor market risk that might be related to both offshorability and individual 
preferences for party positions are the skill specificity of an individual’s occupation or wheth-
er she is a labor market insider or outsider. Table A3 shows that the results are robust when 
we control for these alternative sources of labor market risk. As shown in the online appendix, 
our results are also robust to restricting the sample to active labor market participants, ex-
panding the sample to all retired and non-retired respondents, or including Eastern European 
countries. Using alternative coding of skills and offshorability and including more micro- and 
macro-level controls similarly does not change the conclusions we draw with regard to the 
conditional effect of offshoring.  
Summing up, our results show that, as expected, the gap in partisan preferences between 
low- and high-skilled individuals is much larger among those working in offshorable occupa-
tions than among those individuals sheltered from the offshoring trend. Moreover, this gap 
opens up in the expected directions: those benefitting from offshoring (the high-skilled) prefer 
parties with more neoliberal policy positions, whereas those most threatened by offshoring 
(the low-skilled) prefer parties advocating a large welfare state. 
 
 
4.2. Offshoring and Preferences for Party Families 
In a next step, we turn to individuals’ voting preference for specific party families. As 
discussed above, we focus on the five most common party families and expect that offshoring 
affects voters’ behavior for parties with a clear and vocal position on the economic dimension 
(i.e., left, liberal, and conservative parties), but to play a negligible role in explaining voters’ 
propensity to vote for parties who predominantly focus on non-economic issues (i.e., populist 
right and green parties). Table 3 presents the results of five multi-level probit regressions 
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where the dependent variable is whether a respondent voted for the respective party family in 
the last election. 
 
*** Table 3 about here *** 
 
Among the low-skilled, working in a potentially offshorable job significantly increases 
voters’ tendency to vote for a leftist party and decreases the likelihood of voting for a liberal 
or center-right party, although this effect is not statistically significant. The sizeable and sta-
tistically significant interaction terms between job offshorability and education years for all of 
these parties demonstrate, however, that exposure to offshoring affects voting behavior, and 
does so especially among the high-skilled. To facilitate the interpretation of the interaction 
term, figure 3 plots the marginal effects of offshorability on party preferences at different skill 
levels.17 In case of left parties, working in a potentially offshorable occupation significantly 
increases the likelihood of voting for left parties for everyone who enjoyed less than eight 
years of full-time education. In contrast, respondents with at least twelve years of education 
are significantly less likely to vote for a left party when they work in an offshorable occupa-
tion. This shows that low-skilled individuals exposed to offshoring risks are particularly likely 
to vote for the traditional advocates of welfare state expansion and redistribution, whereas 
high-skilled individuals in offshorable jobs are least likely to vote for these parties. Our ar-
gument suggests that this latter group should instead vote for liberal or center-right parties as 
advocates of free-market policies and minimal government intervention in the economy, and 
our results support this line of reasoning. Figure 3B shows that offshorability significantly 
increases the propensity to vote for a liberal party for all individuals with at least eleven years 
of education. Somewhat unexpectedly, offshorability does not have a direct effect on liberal 
party preferences among the low skilled, possibly reflecting the fact that these parties are un-
attractive to less privileged voters in general. We find similar effects for center-right parties 
(i.e., conservative and Christian democratic parties), who tend to push for further liberaliza-
tion measures although they tend not to propose major cuts in compensation policies. Job off-
shorability has a negative, though insignificant effect on the voting propensity of low-skilled 
individuals for centrist parties (see figure 3C). As for the liberal parties, offshoring has a sta-
tistically significant effect on the voting behavior of those individuals with at least eleven 
years of education. Among this group, offshoring increases the propensity to vote for center-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 We interpret the effect of the interaction term via marginal effects plots because both size and statistical signif-
icance of the estimated coefficient can vary in case of non-linear models (Ai & Norton, 2003). 
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right parties, and this effect gets larger the more years of full-time education an individual has 
received. 
 
*** Figure 3 about here *** 
 
Our argument furthermore suggests that exposure to offshoring should increase the dif-
ference between low- and high-skilled individuals’ voting behavior with regard to these three 
party families. To investigate differences in the vote gap between these two groups, we calcu-
late the first difference in predicted probabilities between high- and low-skilled respondents 
for those in occupations sheltered from and those in occupations exposed to offshoring, hold-
ing all other variables at their median.18 We then use this information to calculate the percent-
age increase (or decrease) in the vote gap between these groups. Table 4 presents the results. 
For left parties, the difference in predicted probabilities between low- and high-skilled re-
spondents working in non-offshorable occupations is 7.75 percentage points. In contrast, this 
difference amounts to 14.42 percentage points if voters are exposed to offshoring. Exposure 
to offshoring thus almost doubles the vote gap between high- and low-skilled voters and this 
difference in vote gaps is statistically significant at the 1% level. We observe similar effects 
for the liberal and center-right parties, although the direction of the effect is reversed in these 
cases because low-skilled voters (at least in offshorable occupations) are less likely to vote for 
these parties, whereas they were more likely to vote for left parties. For the liberal party fami-
ly, the vote gap between low- and high-skilled respondents is 1.20 percentage points among 
those in sheltered occupations and 2.09 percentage points among respondents in exposed oc-
cupations, a sizeable 74% increase. The same is true concerning center-right parties. Among 
those in sheltered jobs, high-skilled voters are more likely to vote for the conservatives than 
low-skilled voters, leading to a difference in voting propensities of 1.79 percentage points. 
Among those in offshorable jobs, the vote gap between high-skilled and low-skilled voters 
more than triples amounting to a difference in voting probabilities of 5.41 percentage points. 
Taken together, this suggests that job offshorability reverses the difference in voting probabil-
ities for center-right parties between low- and high-skilled individuals reverses by an absolute 
amount of 3.63 percentage points. 
 
*** Table 4 about here *** 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 We use 8 and 20 education years respectively, because they represent the 5th and 95th percentile of the educa-
tion years variable in our sample. 
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In contrast to the three party families examined so far, we do not expect systematic dif-
ferences related to offshoring for those parties with a strong focus on non-economic issues, 
most notably the populist right and green parties. The results presented in columns 4 and 5 in 
table 3 support these expectations. Whereas the educational background has indeed a strong 
and statistically significantly effect on individuals’ voting preference for these parties – edu-
cation is negatively correlated with party preferences for the populist right and positively with 
those for green parties – exposure to offshoring has no such effect. For these two party fami-
lies, skill-level also does not affect the strong relationship between offshorability and electoral 
preferences, evidenced by the small and statistically insignificant interaction terms. The mar-
ginal effect plots in figures 3D and 3E demonstrate the result that offshorability has no con-
sistent statistically significant conditional effect on voting propensity irrespective of the years 
of schooling. As a result, the vote gap between high- and low-skilled individuals is almost 
identical for individuals working in non-offshorable occupations and those working in off-
shorable occupations (see table 4). All in all, our findings show that offshoring does not in-
crease the popularity of populist right and green parties. 
Once more, the control variables are in line with our expectations. Women and respond-
ents living in urban areas are more likely to vote for the left and for green parties. Left parties 
and the populist right are particularly likely to attract votes from the unemployed. And liberal 
and center-right parties are more likely to attract high-income voters, whereas poorer re-
spondents are more likely to vote for the left, the populist right, and the Greens. Populist right 
and center-right parties are especially attractive to respondents who are sensitive towards im-
migration on cultural grounds. Finally, we find that in general, individuals with lower levels 
of education are more likely to vote for the left and particularly more likely to vote for the 
populist right, whereas higher levels of education are associated with a higher propensity to 
vote for liberal and green parties. Higher overall unemployment rates strengthen electoral 
support for parties of the left but depress the vote for liberal parties. The same holds for a 
country’s exposure to FDI. Interestingly, FDI seems to dampen the prospects of populist right 
and green parties. 
Once more, we run several robustness checks, and our results are generally robust to 
them. We start with additionally controlling for other types of labor market risk. Table A4 
shows that the expected effects remain robust when controlling for routinization, skill speci-
ficity and outsider status. Similarly, altering the sample size or including more control varia-
bles does not change this picture (see online appendix). Only in one case, that of the liberal 
 24 
party family, are the results sensitive to some model specifications, especially when we con-
trol for union membership. Furthermore, the interaction term loses its statistical significance 
both for the liberal and center-right parties if we include ideology. Finally, we test the robust-
ness of our results with regard to the model specification. Our probit specification does not 
model the simultaneous electoral choice among alternative party families. To check whether 
our results are sensitive to modeling this aspect of the voting decision, we rerun the analysis 
using a multilevel multinomial model. Using left parties as the baseline category. The results 
are robust to this change. For both liberal and center-right parties, we observe a statistically 
significant positive effect of skills implying that high-skilled individuals are more likely to 
vote for these parties than for left parties and the interaction term is positive and statistically 
significant. This means that as before, high-skilled individuals are more likely to vote for lib-
eral parties than for left parties if their job is potentially offshorable. 
Overall, these results provide strong support that offshoring has a significant demand-
side effect for those political parties with a clear and salient position regarding economic poli-
cies of specific relevance with regard to the material effects of offshoring. This effect is par-
ticularly noticeable and sizeable for leftist and center-right parties, and prominent but slightly 
more sensitive to alternative specifications for the liberal parties. Nevertheless, our findings 
show that offshoring affects individual voting behavior, an effect that is most pronounced 
among the high-skilled. However, offshoring does not play an important role in voters’ calcu-
lus when voting for populist right or green parties, who privilege non-economic issues in their 
partisan agendas. This reinforces our point that it is important to take seriously the fact that 
many different parties compete in multi-party systems, for some of which, but not for all, the 





Offshoring has become widespread in developed economies and has turned into an in-
creasingly salient topic in public debates. What are the political consequences of this devel-
opment? Our paper has investigated this question with regard to electoral and partisan politics 
in multi-party systems. We argue and show that the material consequences of offshoring af-
fect voters’ party preferences. However, this effect is far from being uniform: Not only is ex-
posure to offshoring associated with significant differences in party preferences among high- 
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and low-skilled individuals, it also affects the electoral success of some parties more than 
others.  
We argue that this variation is explained by two important insights: First, the individual-
level material consequences of offshoring vary significantly among individuals based on their 
skill-level and their exposure to offshoring. Offshoring creates both winners and losers, with 
high-skilled individuals in offshorable jobs benefitting from the opportunities and low-skilled 
individuals with offshorable jobs exposed to the risks associated with this development. At 
the same time, individuals working in non-offshorable occupations are sheltered from both 
the risks and opportunities associated with offshoring. We argue that the resulting variation in 
the individual consequences of offshoring translates into variation in electoral, and specifical-
ly party preferences. Second, especially in multi-party systems, political parties vary widely 
in their policy positions and the salience they attach to the socio-economic and the cultural 
dimension of party competition. This means that some parties pursue policies that are particu-
larly relevant for individuals affected – positively or negatively – by offshoring, whereas oth-
er parties emphasize policy fields for which offshoring only plays a minor role. 
Taken together, this suggests that offshoring affects the voting behavior of some indi-
viduals (those exposed to offshoring) for some parties (those with a strong focus on socio-
economic policy issues), but has no effect on others, at least when the material consequences 
are concerned. Our analyses of the determinants of individual electoral preferences for policy 
positions and party families in 18 European countries over the years 2002 to 2010 confirm 
this hypothesis. Political parties advocating income redistribution and a strong welfare state 
(i.e., left parties) are particularly attractive to low-skilled individuals working in offshorable 
occupations. In contrast, parties with a more market-liberal policy profile (i.e., liberal and 
center-right parties) attract the beneficiaries of offshoring, namely high-skilled individuals in 
offshorable occupations. Finally, as parties emphasizing policy fields unrelated to the globali-
zation of production, offshoring does not affect the electoral fortunes of populist right and 
green parties. 
Our study contributes to the study of the effects of globalization on national politics 
more generally. In particular, it speaks to two ongoing debates: The first is the debate about 
the influence of globalization on individual voting behavior (for a summary, see Kayser, 
2007). Several authors have argued that globalization reduces the importance of economic 
issues on vote choice, because it constrains governments’ room to maneuver in economic pol-
icymaking (e.g., Ross, 2000; Hellwig & Samuels, 2007; Steiner & Martin, 2012). While this 
may be true in the aggregate, our results suggest that there is much more nuance in individual 
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voting behavior than these studies suggest. Globalization does not affect all voters in a uni-
form manner, but its consequences vary widely within the electorate. Both globalization los-
ers and winners seem quite aware of the specific economic and social policy packages differ-
ent parties offer, and vote accordingly. Moreover, by stressing that the material consequences 
of offshoring matter for voting decisions, our analysis challenges studies that claim that indi-
vidual voting behavior and policy preferences are influenced mostly by non-material issues 
rather than voters’ material self-interest related to globalization (e.g. Hellwig & Samuels, 
2007; Duch & Stevenson, 2008; Hellwig, 2008; Mansfield & Mutz, 2009; 2013). A final con-
tribution to this debate is our focus on the electoral dynamics related to party-politics, rather 
than a focus on voting behavior vis-à-vis incumbent policymakers. 
Because of this, our paper also contributes to a second debate, the debate about the in-
fluence of globalization on party competition. A large literature shows that globalization af-
fects partisan politics in developed countries (Boix, 1998; Garrett, 1998; Swank, 2002; Kriesi 
et al., 2008; Adams, Haupt, & Stoll, 2009; Haupt, 2010b; Ward, Ezrow, & Dorussen, 2011; 
Burgoon, 2012b). Nonetheless, researchers have lamented the lack of attention to how the 
effects of globalization on public opinion indirectly affect party competition (Ward et al., 
2011) and have emphasized the need for further research on globalization’s impact on politi-
cal parties, particularly on parties of the center and right (Adams et al., 2009). Our analysis 
provides such an analysis by showing that the impact of offshoring varies strongly across par-
ty families and providing a theoretically grounded explanation for this finding. Because our 
analysis goes beyond the classic left-right divide, our findings are particularly relevant for the 
majority of countries characterized by multi-party systems. Importantly, our analysis shows 
that the material consequences of offshoring are not a salient issue for one party family that 
has been frequently characterized as catering to globalization losers, the populist right 
(Mughan et al., 2003; Kriesi et al., 2008). In contrast, we find that these parties appeal to low-
skilled workers in general, irrespective of whether they work in occupations exposed to or 
sheltered from offshoring. One possible explanation is that low-skilled individuals are pres-
sured both by the globalization of production (in the form of offshoring-risk) and by the glob-
alization of labor (in the form of labor market competition from migrants), which creates la-
bor market risks for low-skilled workers across the board (Dancygier & Walter, 2015). Popu-
list right parties appeal to the losers of globalization as a more general phenomenon, compris-
ing the globalization of production, labor, and culture, who seem to share a general distrust of 
anything foreign. In contrast, leftist, liberal, and center-right parties advocate policies that 
specifically benefit the losers and winners from offshoring, but not necessarily those affected 
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by other forms of globalization. For these parties, we observe a distinct effect of offshoring as 
a specific type of globalization. Our results thus show that for some voter subgroups, the dif-
ferent types of globalization pressures are important, whereas they matter less for other 
groups, whereby the interrelationship between these different globalization types is likely to 
be a promising avenue for future research. 
Overall, our findings underline the importance of distinguishing between specific types 
of globalization, their specific individual-level effects and different types of parties. When 
this is taken into account, offshoring has clear and identifiable effects on voters’ electoral 








Figure 2: Conditional Effect of Offshorability on Voting for Partisan Policy Positions 
 
Notes: Marginal effect of offshorability on different partisan policy positions based on models reported in table 
2. Graphs based on STATA code developed by Brambor et al. (2006).   
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Figure 3: Conditional Effect of Offshorability on Voting for Party Families 
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Notes: Marginal effect of offshorability on preferences for different party families,  based on models reported in 
table 3. Graphs based on STATA code developed by Brambor et al. (2006)  
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Left-Right Position – + 
Welfare-State Policies + – 
Market-Liberal Policies – + 
Left Parties + – 
Liberal Parties – + 
Center-Right Parties – + 
Populist Right Parties 0 0 
Green Parties 0 0 
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Education years -0.104*** -0.003 -0.029*** 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) 
Offshorability -1.616*** 0.458** -0.287** 
 (0.57) (0.19) (0.12) 
Education x Offshorability 0.181*** -0.047*** 0.037*** 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) 
Income 0.510*** -0.163*** 0.086*** 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) 
Female -1.713*** 0.410*** -0.315*** 
 (0.15) (0.05) (0.03) 
Age in years -0.235*** 0.074*** -0.039*** 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age squared 0.002*** -0.001*** 0.000*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Unemployed -1.511*** 0.444*** -0.277*** 
 (0.34) (0.11) (0.07) 
Urban area -1.427*** 0.334*** -0.196*** 
 (0.16) (0.06) (0.04) 
Anti-immigration attitude 1.309*** -0.267*** 0.204*** 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) 
Unemployment rate -0.072 -0.248*** 0.049*** 
 (0.06) (0.02) (0.01) 
FDI stock 0.068*** -0.008*** 0.002*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
# of respondents 46075 46075 46075 
# of countries 18 18 18 
R2 (overall) 0.073 0.058 0.012 
Prob > Chi2 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Multilevel OLS estimates with standard errors in parentheses. 
Level of statistical significance: * p≤0.10; ** p≤0.05; *** p≤0.01. 
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Table 3: Determinants of Individual Preferences for Party Families 
 Left Liberal Center-Right Populist Right Green 
Education years -0.017*** 0.019*** 0.004* -0.049*** 0.049*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Offshorability 0.159*** -0.052 -0.051 -0.018 -0.013 
 (0.04) (0.07) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) 
Education x Offshorability -0.015*** 0.009** 0.008** -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Income -0.033*** 0.040*** 0.042*** -0.023*** -0.045*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Female 0.054*** -0.053*** -0.030** -0.214*** 0.216*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Age in years 0.029*** -0.016*** -0.019*** -0.004 0.008 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age squared -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Unemployed 0.138*** -0.131*** -0.151*** 0.132*** 0.018 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) 
Urban area 0.102*** -0.014 -0.187*** -0.017 0.221*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Anti-immigration attitude -0.060*** -0.004 0.048*** 0.175*** -0.127*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Unemployment rate 0.021*** -0.056*** -0.010** -0.011 -0.002 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) 
FDI stock 0.001*** -0.002*** 0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
# effective parties -0.102*** -0.012 0.014 0.069*** 0.107*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
# of respondents 52629 52629 52629 52629 52629 
# of countries 18 18 18 18 18 
R2 (McKelvey/Zavoina) 0.063 0.023 0.045 0.123 0.083 
Prob > Chi2 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
BIC 66685.14 31539.77 61652.81 17296.23 22420.72 
Log likelihood -33239.30 -15666.61 -30723.13 -8544.84 -11107.08 
Multilevel probit estimates with standard errors in parentheses. 
Level of statistical significance: * p≤0.10; ** p≤0.05; *** p≤0.01. 
  
 35 
Table 4: Substantial Effect of Offshorability, Conditional on Skill-Level 
 (I) 
Difference in voting 
probability between 
low- and high-skilled 
respondents in  
non-offshorable jobs 
(II) 
Difference in voting 
probability between 
low- and high-skilled 
individuals in  
offshorable jobs 
(III) 
= (II – I) 
Change in voting 
probability between 
low- and high-skilled 
due to offshorability 
(IV) 
Change in voting 
probability between 
low- and high-skilled 
due to offshorability 
in percent 
Left 7.75 14.42 6.67*** 86.12 
Liberal -1.20 -2.09 -0.89 74.36 
Center-Right -1.79 -5.41 -3.63** 203.06 
Populist Right 1.19 1.11 -0.07 6.18 
Green -1.49 -1.20 0.29 19.50 
Predicted probabilities are based on the models reported in table 3, with control variables held at their median. 
Low-skilled individuals have 8 (5th percentile) education years, high-skilled individuals 20 (95th percentile). A 
positive difference implies that low-skilled individuals are more likely to vote for the respective party family. 






Table A1: Operationalization and Summary Statistics 
 Operationalization  N Mean Sd. Min. Max. 
       
Dependent Variables       
Overall left-right scale Variable rile from Volkens et al. 
(2013), matched on the basis of 
ESS question B14 in 2002 and 
B12 in 2004-2010 
 80832 -5.67 17.79 -48.00 72.50 
Welfare-state policies Variable welfare from Volkens 
et al. (2013), see above 
 80257 14.74 7.11 1.03 41.98 
Market-liberal policies Variable markeco from Volkens 
et al. (2013), see above 
 80832 3.18 3.61 0.00 21.95 
Left vote ESS question B14 in 2002 and 
B12 in 2004-2010 
 92927 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Liberal vote ESS question B14 in 2002 and 
B12 in 2004-2010 
 92927 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 
Center-right vote ESS question B14 in 2002 and 
B12 in 2004-2010 
 92927 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Populist right vote ESS question B14 in 2002 and 
B12 in 2004-2010 
 92927 0.05 0.23 0.00 1.00 
Green vote ESS question B14 in 2002 and 
B12 in 2004-2010 
 92927 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00 
       
Independent Variables       
Education years ESS question F7 in 2002-2008 
and F16 in 2010 
 150116 12.06 4.27 0.00 25.00 
Job offshorability 
(binary: category 1 is 
non-offshorable) 
Blinder (2009), matched on the 
basis of ISCO-code 
 135567 0.38 0.49 0.00 1.00 
       
Individual-Level Control Variables       
Income ESS question F30 in 2002, F32 
in 2004-2008 and F41 in 2010 
 115009 -0.03 2.37 -8.00 8.00 
Female ESS question F2 in 2002-2010  151758 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Age (in years) ESS question F3 in 2002-2010  151313 47.25 18.46 12.00 123.00 
Unemployed ESS question F8a in 2002-2008 
and F17a in 2010 
 151888 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00 
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Urban area ESS question F5 in 2002-2008 
and F14 in 2010 
 151464 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00 
Cultural attitudes 
against immigration 
ESS question D28 in 2002 and 
B39 in 2004-2010 
 146872 4.98 2.48 0.00 10.00 
Routinization Acemoglu and Autor (2011), 
matched on the basis of ISCO-
code 
 113080 -0.21 1.02 -3.15 2.83 
Skill specificity Iversen (2001), matched on the 
basis of ISCO 
 135567 1.17 0.68 0.48 4.11 
Outsider status ESS question F14 in 2002-2008 
and F23 in 2010 
 151888 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00 
 
Country-Level Control Variables 
Unemployment rate OECD (2013); harmonized 
unemployment rate 
 151888 7.12 3.06 2.52 20.06 
FDI stock UNCTAD (2013); sum of in-
ward and outward FDI stocks in 
% of GDP 
 151888 108.42 67.49 16.66 301.95 
Effective # of parties Bormann and Golder (2013); 
effective number of electoral 
parties (without other parties) 
 151888 3.99 1.54 2.15 9.07 
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Table A2: Party Family Classification 
 Code 
Schmidt (2010, 2012) classi-
fication 
Volkens et al. (2013)  
classification 





Liberal 2 Liberal Liberal 





Populist Right 4 Right Nationalist 
Green 5 Green Ecology 
















Education years -0.275*** 0.126*** -0.021*** 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)    
Offshorability -1.956*** 0.967*** -0.195    
 (0.68) (0.27) (0.14)    
Education x Offshorability 0.224*** -0.099*** 0.027*** 
 (0.05) (0.02) (0.01)    
Income 0.613*** -0.293*** 0.044*** 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.01)    
Female -2.099*** 0.408*** -0.444*** 
 (0.19) (0.08) (0.04)    
Age in years -0.211*** 0.077*** -0.031*** 
 (0.05) (0.02) (0.01)    
Age squared 0.002*** -0.001*** 0.000*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Unemployed -0.480 -0.013 -0.062    
 (0.41) (0.16) (0.08)    
Urban area -2.194*** 0.554*** -0.244*** 
 (0.20) (0.08) (0.04)    
Routinization 0.213** -0.100** 0.032    
 (0.10) (0.04) (0.02)    
Skill specificity -0.778*** 0.399*** -0.037    
 (0.17) (0.07) (0.04)    
Outsider status -1.437*** 0.342*** -0.261*** 
 (0.30) (0.12) (0.06)    
Unemployment rate -0.241*** -0.088*** -0.184*** 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)    
FDI stock 0.040*** 0.006*** -0.002*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
# of respondents 38392 38392 38392 
# of countries 18 18 18 
R2 (overall) 0.049 0.062 0.036 
Prob > Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Multilevel OLS estimates with standard errors in parentheses. 
Level of statistical significance: * p≤0.10; ** p≤0.05; *** p≤0.01. 
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Table A4: Determinants of Individual Preferences for Party Families – Robustness 
 Left Liberal Center-Right Populist Right Green 
Education years -0.004 0.014*** -0.008*** -0.052*** 0.061*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Offshorability 0.139*** -0.039 -0.056 -0.048 0.068    
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09)    
Education x Offshorability -0.015*** 0.011** 0.008** -0.006 -0.007    
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)    
Income -0.025*** 0.032*** 0.037*** -0.022*** -0.042*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)    
Female 0.088*** -0.074*** -0.055*** -0.253*** 0.225*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)    
Age in years 0.031*** -0.016*** -0.023*** -0.009 0.012**  
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)    
Age squared -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 -0.000*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Unemployed 0.091*** -0.123*** -0.099*** 0.109** 0.008    
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05)    
Urban area 0.125*** -0.026 -0.204*** -0.043* 0.258*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02)    
Routinization 0.050*** -0.020* -0.038*** 0.110*** -0.071*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    
Skill specificity 0.066*** -0.091*** -0.080*** 0.096*** -0.014    
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)    
Outsider status 0.041** -0.005 -0.100*** -0.033 0.145*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03)    
Unemployment rate 0.021*** -0.054*** -0.010** -0.027 -0.006    
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01)    
FDI stock 0.001*** -0.002*** 0.001*** -0.001** -0.001*   
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
# effective parties -0.106*** -0.014 0.024 0.063** 0.116*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)    
# of respondents 44062 44062 44062 44062 44062 
# of countries 0.060 0.026 0.047 0.068 0.063 
R2 (McKelvey/Zavoina) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Prob > Chi2 55967.89 25297.23 51903.51 15407.68 19142.87 
BIC -27871.66 -12536.33 -25839.47 -7591.56 -9459.15 
Log likelihood -0.004 0.014*** -0.008*** -0.052*** 0.061*** 
Multilevel probit estimates with standard errors in parentheses. 
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